The venue of a suit for infringement of copyright is not determined by the general provision governing suits in the federal district courts. Rather, copyright actions are subject to the venue provision set forth in the Copyright Act in 28 U.S.C. § 1400(a). 28 U.S.C. § 1400(a) provides that “[c]ivil actions, suits, or proceedings arising under any Act of Congress relating to copyrights or exclusive rights in mask works or designs may be instituted in the district in which the defendant or his agent resides or may be found.”
Courts have rejected attempts by a plaintiff to argue venue using a state-wide jurisdictional analysis. See Milwaukee Concrete Studios, Ltd. v. Fjeld Manuf Co., 8 F.3d 441, 446 (7th Cir. 1993) (“It is not sufficient that [defendant] would be subject to personal jurisdiction under the … long-arm statute by virtue of contacts with another district in [the] state.”) Thus, for purposes of venue, the focus is whether a DotCom would be subject to personal jurisdiction in a foreign state. “The court uses basically the same procedure to decide a motion to dismiss for improper venue as it does for deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.” See Brayton Purcell LLP v. Recordon& Recordon, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1138 (N.D. Cal. 2005)